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The built environment, which includes not only buildings but infrastructure, mediates 
several important climate impacts on public health and is also subject to diverse legal 
requirements. It is a subject of particular focus for policy efforts aimed at promoting adaptive 
responses to climate change on the part of institutions and individuals. This chapter presents key 
examples of public health impacts that arise from climate change but are mediated—possibly 
mitigated, possibly exacerbated—by elements of the build environment. It also describes the 
process and substance of adaptive responses to those impacts. Having presented these physical 
and policy contexts in its first Section, this chapter’s second Section considers the role the law 
could play as individuals, organizations, and localities react to climate-driven harms and seek to 
adapt. 
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The built environment—meaning buildings and the infrastructure systems on which they 
and their occupants rely
1
—arises from layered human decisions.
2
 In 2008, a team of public 
health researchers put it this way:  
Distinct from the natural environment, the built environment is comprised [sic] of 
manmade components of people’s surroundings, from small-scale settings (e.g., 
offices, houses, hospitals, shopping malls, and schools) to large-scale settings 
(e.g., neighborhoods, communities, and cities), as well as roads, sidewalks, green 
spaces, and connecting transit systems. The development of the built environment 
involves many sectors, including urban planning, architecture, engineering, local 




They also noted, of course, that “[t]he built environment influences human choices, which in turn 
affect health,” specifically, “physical activity, respiratory and cardiac health, injury risk, chronic 
disease risk, social connectedness, and mental health. . . .”
4
 However, because all social and 
economic institutions rely to some degree on the built environment,
5
 as climate change redraws 
shorelines and modifies seasons, temperatures, and weather patterns, the responsive changes to 
the built environment will implicate a host of interests, public health just one among them. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first discusses key climate impacts on 
public health that are mediated in some way by the built environment. It also discusses the 
process and substance of adaptive responses to those impacts. The second part considers the role 
the law could play as individuals, organizations, and localities react to climate-driven harms and 
seek to adapt. 
Before proceeding to those discussions, it is important to first define some key terms. 
Climate change is the basic cause of a large number of immediate and intermediate effects—that 
                                                          
1
 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special Publication 1190, Community Resilience Planning Guide 
for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems vol. I, at 13 (May. 2016), https://perma.cc/ZVH7-GEJ2. 
2
 William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis 62 (1991) (contrasting the natural environment, or “first nature,” with 
“structures of the human economy,” or “second nature”). 
3
 Margalit Younger et al., The Built Environment, Climate Change, and Health: Opportunities for Co-Benefits, 35(5) 




 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special Publication 1190, Community Resilience Planning Guide 
for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems vol. II, at 27 tbl. 10-4 (Oct. 2015), https://perma.cc/ZVH7-GEJ2 (providing 
thorough list of links between institutions and buildings, including direct and indirect impacts arising from damage 
to buildings). 
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is, effects that cause further effects. The public health and disaster management communities 
have developed terminology that is useful to climate change adaptation policymakers who must 
sort through the problem of which effects/causes to address and how to track and coordinate 
adaptation efforts’ success.
6
 In this lexicon, stressor and hazard both refer to an underlying 
cause, such as rising ambient temperatures. Stressor tends to refer to chronic and slow-moving 
causes;
7
 hazard is applicable both to slow-moving causes, such as drought, and sudden-onset 
causes such as destructive coastal storms. If drought or storms strike in a location far removed 
from human populations or development, then there is no exposure to them. The degree of 
exposure to a stressor or hazard varies with location and the ability of people or structures in that 
location to endure it without disruption—thus, someone with central air conditioning who works 
indoors might not be highly exposed to extreme heat even if her location experiences a heat 
wave.
8
 Among the populations and assets that are exposed and cannot mitigate or avoid that 
exposure, some are more sensitive—that is, susceptible or unable to cope—than others. For 
instance, as noted in Chapter 3, children, the elderly, and the disabled are generally physically 
less able to endure hazards such as heat or air quality made worse by climate-driven stressors. 
Those who are both sensitive and exposed are vulnerable. Some populations that are vulnerable 
are also resilient, however, meaning that they are capable of recovering quickly from exposure to 
a hazard even though they are vulnerable to it.
9
 
I. Adapting the built environment to address public health impacts of climate change 
This sub-section begins with a description of key public health impacts of climate change 
that relate directly to the built environment. It is not meant to be exhaustive and seeks to avoid 
redundancy with the descriptions of impacts covered by other chapters. After providing that brief 
survey of impacts, it addresses the task of adapting the built environment in response to those 
impacts. It begins by noting how various frameworks would organize that task, and then 
                                                          
6
 B.L. Turner II et al., A framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science, 100 Proceedings Nat’l 
Academy Sci. 8074 (2003), 10.1073/pnas.1231335100; see also Janet L. Gamble et al., U.S. Global Change 
Research Program, Populations of Concern, in The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the United 
States: A Scientific Assessment 247, 249 (Alison Crimmins et al., eds., 2016). 
7
 But see Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Energy, A Review of Climate Change 
Vulnerability Assessments: Current Practices and Lessons Learned from DOE’s Partnership for Energy Sector 
Climate Resilience 10–12 (May 2016), https://perma.cc/G3YB-R546 (referring to sudden and slow-onset climate-
driven effects as “stressors”). 
8
 See, e.g., Amiche Alcindor, In Sweltering South, Climate Change Is Now a Workplace Hazard, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
3, 2017, https://perma.cc/4ULU-DXRQ (“They don’t know what’s going on . . . because they are in cool houses and 
in offices,” Mr. Guerra said.”). 
9
 UNISDR, 2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009); see also UNISDR, The Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (2015), 
https://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf; Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: 
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, Extract from the final report of the World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction (A/CONF.206/6) (2005), 
http://www.unisdr.org/files/1037_hyogoframeworkforactionenglish.pdf.  
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examines key elements of the process and substance of adaptation efforts focused on the built 
environment. 
A. Key examples of climate-driven public health impacts transmitted by the built 
environment 
Atop the list of issues that adaptation planning must address in the built environment are 
public health vulnerabilities traceable to the following hazards: too much water due to sea level 
rise and/or extreme precipitation; temperatures that are more variable and generally higher; too 
little water, i.e., drought; and extreme events such as storms and wildfires.
10
 Exposure to these 
hazards takes a variety of forms. Some are direct, such as outdoor workers encountering long 
periods of hot and humid weather. Others, particularly where the climate-driven stressor interacts 
with other hazards, are indirect, such as outdoor or indoor air quality made worse by higher 
temperatures boosting air pollution levels, mold growth promoted by more heat and humidity in 
buildings, or exposure to toxic waste introduced into the environment by the flooding of a 
brownfield or a waste storage facility located on a coastline. Still other vulnerabilities that arise 
from indirect exposure to hazards owe to those hazards’ disruption of infrastructure: transit 




Rather than attempting a comprehensive review of how climate change adaptation efforts 
respond to the diverse climate-driven hazards and vulnerabilities that bear upon and are mediated 
by the built environment, this chapter focuses on two hazards in particular: hotter ambient 
temperatures; and coastal flooding driven by sea level rise (SLR).
12
 
1. Heat  
Cities amplify the direct effects of hotter ambient temperatures driven by climate change; 
this phenomenon is termed the urban heat island effect.
13
 In cities, asphalt, concrete, and other 
artificial surfaces with low albedo (reflectivity) absorb solar radiation and then express it as heat, 
                                                          
10
 Many of the climate-driven vulnerabilities related directly to the built environment are described at length in 
Chapters 3, 7 (heat), 8 (storms), 9 (infectious disease), and 10 (food and agriculture) of this volume. See also S.L. 
Cutter et al., Ch. 11: Urban Systems, Infrastructure, and Vulnerability, in Climate Change Impacts in the United 
States: The Third National Climate Assessment (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014). 
11
 See NOAA, U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit: Built Environment, https://toolkit.climate.gov/topics/built-
environment (accessed July 1, 2017). 
12
 Riverine flooding driven by severe precipitation and early snowmelts, wildfires, and drought are all also examples 
of climate change-driven impacts that affect public health via the built environment. This chapter recognizes the 
importance and relevance of these impacts, see, e.g., Dennis M. Knobloch, Moving a Community in the Aftermath of 
the Great 1993 Midwest Flood, 130 J. Contemporary Water Res. & Edu. 41 (Mar. 2005), https://perma.cc/39T9-
VTTV, but space constraints put discussion of them beyond its scope. 
13
 See Joyce Klein-Rosenthal + Jeffrey Raven, Urban Heat And Urban Design — An Opportunity To Transform In 
NYC, The Sallan Foundation: Snapshot, July 18, 2017, https://perma.cc/X45Q-RDRR (describing effect and its 
causes). 
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and the relative (or total) absence of vegetation often means that these surfaces are largely 
unshaded and are not cooled through the evapotranspiration of moisture. Cities’ absorptive 
capacity for heat is compounded by urban layouts that obstruct cooling breezes, and by the 




Within and beyond the bounds of cities, hotter temperatures also impair the functioning 
of transportation systems and electricity infrastructure.
15
 Those systems’ vulnerability to heat 
compounds the heat-related vulnerabilities of people and assets that rely on their smooth 
operation. Thus, these vulnerable systems can be the source of indirect adverse public health 
effects. 
The other key indirect effects of hotter temperatures result from their contribution to 
poorer outdoor and indoor air quality—a leading scourge of public health.
16
 This relates to the 
built environment because, as discussed in Chapters 3, 7, and 13, hotter temperatures promote 
ozone formation in places downwind of roads, power plants, and other sources of nitrogen oxides 
and volatile organic compounds
17
—a hazard to which children and the elderly are especially 
vulnerable.
18
 More frequent or intense precipitation and/or flooding can also promote mold 
growth indoors, which in turn can visit an array of adverse public health impacts on residents.
19
  
2. Coastal flooding 
Recent events in the Northeast, Florida, and Louisiana illustrate the vulnerabilities 
traceable to the coastal flooding that is being made ever more severe and frequent by rising sea 
levels and intensifying coastal storms. 




 Sofia Aivalioti, Electricity Sector Adaptation to Heat Waves (Jan. 2015), https://perma.cc/ZML6-3QVQ; Henry 
G. Schwartz, Michael Meyer, et al., Ch. 5: Transportation, in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The 
Third National Climate Assessment 130, 132–33 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014) (noting effects of heat on roads, 
bridges, rails, and aircraft performance). 
16
 Philip J. Landrigan, Air pollution and health, The Lancet: Public Health 2(1) e4-e5 (Jan. 2017) (“Air pollution is 
one of the great killers of our age.”); Frank J. Kelly & Julia C. Fussell, Air pollution and public health: emerging 
hazards and improved understanding of risk, 37(4) Environmental Geochemistry & Health 631–649 (2015). 
17
 James N. Galloway & William H. Schlesinger et al., Ch. 15: Biogeochemical Cycles, in Climate Change Impacts 
in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment 350, 357 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014) (“Rates of 
ozone formation are ac- celerated by higher temperatures, creating a reinforcing cycle between rising temperatures 
and continued human alteration of the nitrogen and carbon cycles. Rising temperatures also work against some of 
the benefits of air pollution control.”). 
18
 Radley Horton & Gary Yohe et al., Ch. 16: Northeast, in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third 
National Climate Assessment 371, 377 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014). 
19
 George Luber & Kim Knowlton et al., Ch. 9: Human Health, in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The 
Third National Climate Assessment 220, 222 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014). 
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 which struck the New Jersey and New York coasts in November 
2012, drowned dozens of people, destroyed hundreds and damaged thousands of coastal homes 
and businesses, and wreaked damage and severe disruptions on transit and electricity systems, 
wastewater treatment plants, and other assets and infrastructure.
21
 Acute public health impacts 
included injury, death, exacerbated illnesses, and “bypass events” (i.e., flows of raw sewage into 
coastal waters) resulting from the powering down of several wastewater treatment plants.  
Longer-term public health impacts included mold growth in flooded homes and various adverse 
mental and physical health effects of residents’ displacement from their homes.
22
 Consistent with 
the general distributional pattern of disasters’ impacts, Sandy was disproportionately hard on 
poorer neighborhoods and people with disabilities.
23
  
Miami Beach and Miami are among the cities most notoriously vulnerable to the slow-
moving SLR-driven hazards of nuisance flooding and the salt water infiltration of groundwater 
resources,
24
 though they are not alone.
25
 Nuisance flooding visits substantial cumulative damage 
on stormwater and wastewater management systems, and can also facilitate transmission of 
infectious disease and exposure to toxic chemicals.
26
 Infiltration of groundwater by saltwater can 
compromise drinking water systems relied upon by large populations.
27
 Though these results of 
                                                          
20
 Although the storm’s wind speed rated at the low end of Category 1 hurricanes, its pressure rating was 
comparable to that of a Category 3 hurricane. FEMA, Mitigation Assessment Team Report Hurricane Sandy in New 
Jersey and New York, at i (Nov. 2013), https://perma.cc/U5GH-LJ4M. 
21
 CDC, Deaths Associated with Hurricane Sandy — October–November 2012, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 
Report 62(20); 393-397, May 24, 2013, https://perma.cc/RH2M-K8GM; FEMA, 6 Months Report: Superstorm 
Sandy from Pre-Disaster to Recovery, Apr. 25, 2013, https://perma.cc/SA37-QGN3. 
22
 John Manuel, The Long Road to Recovery: Environmental Health Impacts of Hurricane Sandy, Environmental 
Health Perspectives 121:A152–A159 (2013), https://perma.cc/D6VE-VXE9 (“Of the long-term health threats posed 
by Sandy, the most significant is mold growth in homes that were not properly remediated after flooding.”). Recent 
research highlights that the total costs of recovery from storms like Sandy greatly exceed those classified as disaster 
aid in scale and duration, and that non-disaster costs arise from healthcare needs. Tatyana Deryugina, The Fiscal 
Cost of Hurricanes: Disaster Aid versus Social Insurance, Am. Econ. J.: Economic Policy 9(3): 168–198 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/GLF6-J4TN. 
23
 Furman Center for Real Estate & Urban Policy at NYU School of Law, Sandy’s Effects on Housing in New York 
City (Mar. 2013), https://perma.cc/2V4A-E4AV (reporting housing-related impacts of storm surge, broken down by 
income level); see also Adrien A. Weibgen, Note: The Right To Be Rescued: Disability Justice in an Age of 
Disaster, 124 Yale L.J. 2406 (2015) (discussing plight of elderly and disabled during Sandy and in the storm’s 
aftermath). 
24
 David Smiley, Mainland Miami ponders returning neighborhoods to nature in order to survive rising seas, Miami 
Herald, June 9, 2017, https://perma.cc/4A9F-QE6W. 
25
 William V. Sweet & John J. Marra, NOAA, 2015 State of U.S. “Nuisance” Tidal Flooding (June 2016), 
http://perma.cc/9PHH-2ZJ6 (reporting on prevalence and severity of phenomenon across U.S.). 
26
 Stephanie Kruel, The Impacts of Sea-Level Rise on Tidal Flooding in Boston, Massachusetts, 32(6) J. Coastal Res. 
1302-09, 1308 (Nov. 2016), https://perma.cc/3D2A-45K5 (listing among public health risks of recurrent flooding: 
transmission of infectious diseases, exposure to toxic chemicals, growth of mold in residences). 
27
 Robin Kundis Craig, A Public Health Perspective on Sea-Level Rise: Starting Points for Climate Change 
Adaptation, 51 Widener L. Rev. 521 (2010); see also chapters 8 and 9 of this volume.  
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SLR are generally not a source of dramatic images or news stories, their cumulative impacts on 
infrastructure are often just as destructive.
28
 
Populations in coastal Louisiana—rural and urban alike—face a combination of impacts, 
some of them climate-driven. Those populations endured the flooding that accompanied 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, followed by the slower-emerging impacts of toxic spills 
resulting from those storms.
29
 In addition, they continue to experience significant land loss due to 
rapid subsidence,
30
 which has lately been exacerbated by oil spills’ damage to coastal 
vegetation—a natural buffer to storms and source of coastal stability.
31
 Thus SLR and more 
intense storms act as stressors on coastal Louisiana’s existing vulnerabilities.
32
 
B. Adapting to those impacts and others 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, having examined examples of 
adaptation efforts around the world, stated that “[t]here is no single approach to adaptation 
planning because of the complex, diverse, and context-dependent nature of adaptation to climate 
change.”
33
 This makes it difficult to distill a general description of adaptation efforts down to a 
brief summary. However, it is possible—and useful—to take note of the key dimensions of 
adaptation efforts identified by researchers examining numerous programs funded by the U.N.’s 
Global Environment Facilities:  
 timing relative to stimulus (anticipatory, concurrent, reactive); 
 intent (autonomous, planned); 
 spatial scope (local, regional, national); 
 form (e.g., technological, behavioral, financial, institutional); and  
                                                          
28
 Hamed R. Moftakhari et al., Cumulative hazard: The case of nuisance flooding, Earth’s Future, 5,214–223 (2017), 
doi:10.1002/2016EF000494. 
29
 Mark Schleifstein, Extent of oil spills from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is still being assessed, Times-Picayune, 
Aug. 19, 2010, https://perma.cc/62D8-J6MP. 
30
 Jaap H. Nienhuis et al., A New Subsidence Map for Coastal Louisiana, 27 GSA Today (May 2017), 
https://perma.cc/6G93-5W9A (“the fundamental culprit is the isolation of the sediment-delivery system (the 
Mississippi River) from its delta plain and the adjacent coastal zone due to the construction of flood-protection 
levees. As a result, the majority of the sediment carried by this system is funneled into the deep waters of the Gulf of 
Mexico, rather than offsetting the naturally occurring high subsidence rates.”). 
31
 U.S. Geological Survey, USGS, NASA Study Finds Widespread Coastal Land Losses from Gulf Oil Spill, Nov. 
17, 2016, https://perma.cc/FU92-8DX8 (identifying oiling of shorelines from oil spill and erosion due to coastal 
storm as distinct, material causes of shoreline erosion). 
32
 Quantifying Vulnerability, LSU College of Engineering News, Apr. 4, 2013, https://perma.cc/XSC7-QZ7V 
(discussing use of GIS mapping to identify where land subsidence is likely to compromise access to hurricane 
evacuation routes). 
33
 Nobuo Mimura & Roger S. Pulwarty, et al., Adaptation Planning and Implementation, in Climate Change 2014: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (C.B. Field et al. eds. 2014) 869-
898, 871. 
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 degree of necessary change (incremental, transformational).34 
As this list implies, the scope of adaptation efforts focused on the built environment 
could encompass an enormous array of measures. One such might be a nationwide vulnerability 
assessment for airports or rail transportation systems conducted in anticipation of coastal 
flooding and heat waves that exceed parameters assumed by those systems’ current 
engineering.
35
 Another might be a municipality’s adoption of a local ordinance that categorizes 
green roofs as stormwater management infrastructure so that their installation can be funded—
like other capital expenses—using municipal bonds.
36
 Examples of measures responsive to the 
impacts highlighted in part I.A.1 and 2 above are discussed in more detail in subpart I.B.3, 
below. 
1. Process 
There is broad consensus on how adaptation efforts should—and do, in practice—
proceed;
37
 one pair of authors have called the steps involved a “ladder.”
38
 The highly 
conventional steps include most or all of the following: identify hazards, assess vulnerabilities, 
specify objectives, explore options, plan, implement, and evaluate. A large and growing number 
of jurisdictions have undertaken at least some of these steps with respect to those portions of the 
built environment for which they are responsible. However, few climb the full ladder: many have 
identified hazards, fewer have assessed vulnerabilities, fewer still have translated the resulting 
insights into plans and plans into actions, and very few have evaluated the effectiveness of those 
actions.
39
 Notably, larger cities—which have more resources and can more readily dedicate staff 
                                                          
34
 See Bonizella Biagini et al., A typology of adaptation actions: A global look at climate adaptation actions 
financed through the Global Environment Facility, 25 Global Environmental Change 97-108 (Mar. 2014) Cf. City 
and County of Denver, Climate Adaptation Plan (2014), https://perma.cc/FA34-H4XK (dividing adaptation 
activities into short, medium, and long-term). 
35
 Cf. Henry G. Schwartz, Michael Meyer, et al., Ch. 5: Transportation, in Climate Change Impacts in the United 
States: The Third National Climate Assessment 130-49, 133-34 (J. M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014). 
36
 See Justin Gundlach, Putting Green Infrastructure on Private Property in New York City, 28 ENVTL. L. IN 
N.Y. 140, 148 (Sept. 2017) (noting financing challenges arising from accounting treatment of green infrastructure). 
37
 See, e.g., NOAA, U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit: Steps to Resilience, https://toolkit.climate.gov/#steps (accessed 
Aug. 4, 2017); Helge Bormann et al., Guiding Regional Climate Adaptation in Coastal Areas, in Handbook of 
Climate Change Adaptation 337, 350–52 (Walter Leal Filho ed. 2015); P.M. Groffman, et al., Ch. 8: Ecosystems, 
Biodiversity, and Ecosystem Services, in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate 
Assessment (J.M. Melillo et al. eds. 2014) 195-219, 202; Timothy Carter et al., Technical Guidelines for Assessing 
Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations, in IPCC, Climate Change 1995—Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of 
Climate Change: Scientific-Technical Analyses 823 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 1995). 
38
 E.M. Hamin & N. Gurran, Climbing the Adaptation Planning Ladder: Barriers and Enablers in Municipal 
Planning, in Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation (W. Leal Filho, ed. 2015). 
39
 Several surveys of adaptation efforts by local governments report that many complete the initial steps of 
identifying hazards but fewer conduct vulnerability assessments, fewer integrate their findings into planning efforts, 
fewer still implement those plans, and very few evaluate those plans’ effectiveness. See John Nordgren et al., 
Supporting local climate change adaptation: Where we are and where we need to go, 66 Environmental Science & 
Policy 344–52, 347 (Dec. 2016); Linda Shi et al., Global Patterns of Adaptation Planning: Results from a global 
survey, in The Routledge Handbook of Urbanization and Global Environmental Change 336, 341–43 (Karen C. Seto 
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Identifying hazards. An effort to adapt necessarily begins by surveying the current and 
expected future climate in a particular area, and by identifying hazards potentially affecting the 
population, assets, or infrastructure located there. The process requires interpreting both 
historical data about the parameters of interest (e.g., temperature, flood risk) and data generated 
by climate models that predict future climatic circumstances. Data of the latter sort are 
challenging to derive with high degrees of accuracy for the Earth as a whole, and more so when 
“climate model downscaling” focuses in on the smaller geographic area involved in any given 
adaptation effort.
41
 Predictions are also consequential to publish because they can inform land 
use and investment decisions.  
Several publicly available tools can help an entity or jurisdiction identify hazards arising 
from SLR, temperature and humidity changes, or changes in precipitation patterns,
42
 though 
these tools tend to yield coarse projections at smaller scales.
43
 New York City’s Panel on Climate 
Change (NPCC) has arguably set the gold standard for developing downscaled projections of 
SLR, temperature, and precipitation.
44
 However, the NPCC is both an expensive endeavor and 
one that, notwithstanding its relative superiority, generates projections subject to large 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
et al. eds. 2015) (reporting results from 2011 survey); National Association of Regional Councils, A Survey of 
Regional Planning for Climate Adaptation (2012), https://perma.cc/K3WA-WDDJ. 
40
 Shi et al., supra note 39, at 341–43. 
41
 G. Flato et al., Evaluation of Climate Models, in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution 
of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 741, 817 
(T.F. Stocker et al. eds. 2013) (describing regional climate models as valid but emphasizing their sensitivity to 
imprecise inputs: “This underlines the importance of both the quality of the boundary conditions and the 
downscaling method.”). 
42
 See, e.g., NOAA, Global and Regional Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the United States (Jan. 2017) (including 
regional projections), https://perma.cc/N9AG-8Y6S; NOAA Office for Coastal Management, Sea Level Rise 
Viewer, https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/tools/slr (accessed June 30, 2017); U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, 
MACA CMIP5 Statistically Downscaled Climate Projections, https://toolkit.climate.gov/tool/maca-cmip5-
statistically-downscaled-climate-projections (last updated Jan. 5, 2017); see also Climate Central, Surging Seas, 
http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/ (accessed June 30, 2017). 
43
 The U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit homepage cautions that “[c]limate projections are not predictions,” that 
“[t]he increased spatial resolution of statistically downscaled projections available for temperature and precipitation 
may not be available for all parameters. In addition, increased resolution does not necessarily equate to greater 
fidelity or reliability.” U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, MACA CMIP5 Statistically Downscaled Climate 
Projections, https://toolkit.climate.gov/tool/maca-cmip5-statistically-downscaled-climate-projections (last updated 
Jan. 5, 2017). It also counsels against DIY applications of downscaled modeling data: “For decisions involving the 
use of climate model projections, you may want to consider seeking expertise.” Id. 
44
 See Building the Knowledge Base for Climate Resiliency: New York City Panel on Climate Change 2015 Report, 
1336 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (Jan. 2015). The third round of the panel’s reporting, NPCC3, 
included sea level rise projections for three areas in southeastern New York State that have since been adopted by 
the Department of Environmental Conservation and so must be considered in future planning decisions. See 6 
NYCRR 490 (2017), http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/103877.html.  
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 Whatever data are used, the climate scenarios generated by this step provide 
parameters useful to, for instance, departments of transportation that need to determine how high 
to build a bridge, electric utilities that need to design components that can operate even during 
long durations of high ambient temperatures, floodplain managers that want to guide land use 
and design decisions for long-lived assets, and municipal authorities that need to match the 
carrying capacity of a stormwater management system to the precipitation expected during its 
useful life. 
Assessing vulnerabilities. This step builds on the previous one by identifying conflicts 
between projected climate parameters and the location or operation of existing people, assets, 
and infrastructure. Whether it is being undertaken by an electricity distribution utility,
46
 a city, 
state, or federal agency,
47
 or some other entity, it tends to involve the rendering in layers of 
several data sets over a geographic map. Consider the example in figure _, which excerpts just 
two of the multiple maps collated by the Minnesota Department of Public Health in the 
appendices of its Extreme Heat Toolkit.  




This pair of maps contains layers of information about the geographic density of a 
subpopulation that is especially vulnerable to extreme heat (elderly who live alone), average 
access to residential air conditioning across counties, and the location and availability of air 
conditioned public spaces in those counties. Integrating data like these with data sets that capture 
                                                          
45
 See, e.g., New York City Panel on Climate Change 2015 Report [NPCC2]; Executive Summary, 1336 Annals of 
N.Y. Acad. Sci. 9-17 (2015): at ES-10, n.e (no probabilities assigned to projected mean temperatures because of 
multiple uncertain factors), ES-11 (frequency and intensity of coastal storms are “uncertain at local scales”), ES-13 
(coastal flooding projections subject to multiple uncertainties). 
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 Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment (2015), https://perma.cc/N2NR-
S79A. 
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 See, e.g. U.S. Federal Highway Administration, The Gulf Coast Study, Phase 2: Assessing Transportation System 
Vulnerability to Climate Change: Synthesis of Lessons Learned and Methods Applied (Oct. 2014), 
https://perma.cc/N3R9-DEFN. 
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 Minnesota Department of Health, Extreme Heat Toolkit, Appendix H, H-5 & H-8 (June 2012), 
https://perma.cc/XM4X-2AQE. 
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relative temperature levels as well as factors correlated positively or negatively with 
vulnerability (e.g., density of residents receiving public housing assistance and density of tree 
cover) makes it possible to derive and map a Heat Vulnerability Index for a given jurisdiction. 
(See figure _.) 




Another factor for possible inclusion in urban heat vulnerability maps is the presence of 
ventilation corridors—channels through a cityscape that, if present, can allow the wind’s passage 
to diminish ambient heat.
50
  
Like the maps shown above, maps depicting flood-related vulnerabilities compile data on 
the hazard (i.e., water levels and wave action under different scenarios) and on the area’s 
relevant features, including topography, toxics storage sites, and infrastructure such as bridges or 
electric grid substations. San Mateo County, California’s SLR Vulnerability Assessment, for 
instance, includes “Asset Exposure Maps” that overlay the areas subject to flooding under 
different SLR scenarios with key components of the built environment.
51
 (See figure _.) 
                                                          
49
 Jaime Madrigano et al., A Case-Only Study of Vulnerability to Heat Wave–Related Mortality in New York City 
(2000–2011), 123 Environmental Health Perspecitves 672, 675 fig.1 (July 2015), https://perma.cc/8D9A-LNT7 
(“NYC census tracts according to composite heat vulnerability index. The index is composed of z-scores of the 
following variables: (+) proportion of homes receiving public assistance, (+) proportion of non-Hispanic black 
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New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene based its own HVI on this one. New York City, Cool 
Neighborhoods NYC A Comprehensive Approach to Keep Communities Safe in Extreme Heat 9 fig.3 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/A3NZ-MR8D. 
50
 See Hu, X. M., & M. Xue, Influence of Synoptic Sea-Breeze Fronts on the Urban Heat Island Intensity in Dallas–
Fort Worth, Texas, 144(4) Monthly Weather Review 1487-1507 (2016); M. Roth, Urban heat island, in Handbook 
of Environmental Fluid Dynamics vol. 2, at 2 (2013). 
51
 County of San Mateo, Sea Level Rise Vulnerability Assessment—Draft Report, Appendix B (Apr. 2017), 
https://perma.cc/3RUW-H45G (report without appendices), https://perma.cc/6ZXM-G5YW (Appendix B). 
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Assets located in projected flood zones are thus readily identified as potentially vulnerable. 
Specifying objectives. In some instances, it can be relatively easy to specify feasible 
climate change adaptation objectives for the built environment and public health. For electricity 
distribution utilities, which are under a statutory obligation to provide a minimum level of 
service to a defined group of end-users, the obvious objective vis-à-vis public health is simply to 
meet those obligations in spite of foreseeable climate change-driven hazards and the 
vulnerabilities—for instance, substations not hardened against flooding
53
—arising from them. 
Similarly, the basic adaptation objective of a prison might be to provide adequately for the health 
and wellbeing of its inmates in spite of the effects of heat waves on indoor temperatures.
54
 
However, for institutions with a wider array of competing duties, such as municipalities, 
specifying broadly acceptable and realistic objectives can present challenges.
55
 Furthermore, 
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 Id. at App. B-4. 
53
 The experience of Superstrorm Sandy, flooding from which led to the explosive destruction of the 13th Street 
substation in lower Manhattan, led, among other things, to a thorough vulnerability assessment and plans to harden 
all low-lying substations in New York City against flood risk. See Consolidated Edison, 2015 Capital Work Plan: 
Storm Hardening–East 13th St 138kV & 345 kV Substation, https://perma.cc/63UV-D72S (accessed Aug. 13, 2017) 
(“Based on storm hardening evaluations, this project will raise the existing perimeter flood wall to elevation 18.2’ to 
provide higher storm surge protection, relocate the grade level control room to a higher elevation on the second 
floor, replace the protection scheme of station equipment with new microprocessor relays and fiber optics 
communication in between relays, provide capability to raise transformer control cabinets during a flood event....”). 
54
 See Cole v. Collier, Case 4:14-cv-01698, at 40, 67 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2017) (ordering prison to maintain indoor 
temperatures below heat index of 88°F despite testimony about high costs involved in providing air conditioning 
capacity adequate to the task, and citing Daniel W. E. Holt, Heat in U.S. Prisons and Jails: Corrections and the 
Challenge of Climate Change, Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (Aug. 2015)). 
55
 The Long-Range Transportation Plan (LRTP) developed by Hampton Roads following a grim vulnerability 
assessment is illustrative. As the Georgetown Climate Center explains: “The LRTP concludes that climate impacts, 
specifically sea-level rise, might eventually require the relocation or rebuilding of regional roadways. The LRTP 
explains why it may be difficult to adopt transportation adaptation strategies due to financial constraints, and 
emphasizes that policy alternatives to adapt transportation infrastructure to the impacts posed by hurricanes and 
flooding are limited. The LRTP does not provide for specific, concrete measures that should be taken to safeguard 
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where vulnerabilities are especially large relative to the capacity of the institution charged with 
their address—for instance, the government of a small coastal town
56
—setting out ambitious 
objectives can damage credibility.  
Exploring options and planning. Whereas the foregoing steps do not necessarily require 
public engagement, exploring options for how to achieve adaptation objectives for the built 
environment and then planning how to do so means, inevitably, seeking the approval of a larger 
group of stakeholders.
57
 Put another way, even if the previous steps are done in technocratic 
fashion, deciding what measures to take, how much should be spent on them, and how to pay for 
them involves weighing those measures against the competing priorities of other stakeholders or 
the public as a whole. This is so chiefly because the tools available to adapt (or to push others to 
adapt) the built environment take the form of laws and regulations that govern land use planning, 
infrastructure design, and building design and construction. All of these are highly significant to 
numerous and diverse stakeholders, and are subject to the purview of state or local government.  
These tools lend themselves to “mainstreaming,” that is “integrating climate adaptation 
into existing management plans (for example, hazard mitigation, ecosystem conservation, water 
management, public health, risk contingency, and energy).”
58
 Researchers have found that 
“[m]ainstreaming prevents adaptation from becoming a solely environmental issue, reduces the 
risks of agenda sidelining and lowers administrative and implementation costs.”
59
 The alternative 
to mainstreaming would be to develop adaptation plans independent of land use or infrastructure 
planning processes, and then to implement those independent plans by altering the results of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
infrastructure against rising sea levels.” Georgetown Climate Center, Adaptation Clearinghouse: Hampton Roads 
Climate Change Adaptation Project, https://perma.cc/2R7T-X8R7 (last updated July 7, 2016); see also Hampton 
Roads Transportation Planning Organization, 2034 Long Range Transportation Plan (June 2015). 
56
 See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Hamin et al., Barriers to Municipal Climate Adaptation: Examples From Coastal 
Massachusetts’ Smaller Cities and Towns, 80 J. Am. Planning Ass’n 110-22 (Sept. 2014) (“The planners 
interviewed reported that barriers to adaptation actions tend to be interconnected; for example, the strength of 
private property interests often limits local political leadership on the issue. Without such leadership, it is difficult 
for planners to allocate time and/or money to adaptation activities.”). 
57
 Several how-to adaptation guides encourage adaptation planners to consider the “STAPLEE” categories of factors 
and the stakeholders concerned with each of them: social, technical, administrative, political, legal economic, 
environmental. See South Florida Regional Planning Council, Adaptation Action Areas: A Planning Guidebook for 
Florida’s Local Governments Regional Climate Action Framework: Implementation Guide 63 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/2H39-7WUC; NOAA, Adapting to Climate Change: A Planning Guide for State Coastal Managers 
52–53 (2010), https://perma.cc/E4M2-M6Y7. The STAPLEE list was first developed for the purposes of disaster 
mitigation planning. See FEMA, Developing the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Actions and Implementing Strategies 
(2003), https://perma.cc/56PU-K5CS (listing STAPLEE factors in detail). 
58
 Rosina Bierbaum et al., Ch. 28: Adaptation, in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National 
Climate Assessment 670-706, 682 (J. M. Melillo et al., eds. 2014); see also Ebinezer R. Florano, Mainstreaming 
Integrated Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction in Local Development Plans in the Philippines, 
in Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation 433, 435 tbl.1 (Walter Leal Filho ed. 2015) (noting numerous points of 
convergency between adaptation and disaster mitigation policies and arguing for "mainstreaming" of adaptation by 
unifying both policy areas). 
59
 Linda Shi et al., supra note 39, at 337. 
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conventional planning processes. An example of mainstreaming helps to illustrate its strengths: 
the Boston Water and Sewer Commission (BWSC)’s three-year capital improvement programs 
for stormwater and wastewater have, since 2015, incorporated precipitation and sea level 
parameters based on not just historical weather patterns but also on projections of more severe 
future precipitation and sea-level rise.
60
 They will thus steer design and procurement decisions in 
ways that better adapt the city’s stormwater and wastewater infrastructure to a changing climate, 
and will also avoid maladaptive investments that could put the city’s drinking water or 
wastewater management systems—and thus public health—at risk. These three-year programs 
reflect the parameters established by the climate change vulnerability assessment BWSC 
conducted from 2010 to 2015 as part of its most recent 25-year capital asset plan.
61
 
Implementing and evaluating. Though implementation can mean various things in 
relation to different adaptation measures, in all cases it means the allocation of scarce resources 
to realize plans intended to respond to a climate-related vulnerability. Whether for small-scale 
programs like the deployment of temporary cooling centers, or larger-scale, transformational 
measures like the inland relocation of a coastal community, funds must be appropriated, 
decisions made, and work plans drafted and executed. Taking this step to respond to future risks 
can be difficult—harder, certainly, than assessing vulnerabilities. Unsurprisingly, the authors of 
the Adaptation chapter in the Third National Climate Assessment observed that the key barriers 
to effective adaptation efforts include a “lack of resources to begin and sustain adaptation efforts; 
fragmentation of decision-making; institutional constraints; lack of leadership; and divergent risk 
perceptions/cultures and values.”
62
 In instances where the scale of planned adaptation would be 
not just incremental but transformational, high absolute costs and uncertainty about costs and 
benefits rise to the top of the list of barriers.
63
 Researchers and agencies alike advise that, to 
overcome at least some of these barriers, preference should be given to adaptation measures that 
are likely to yield co-benefits.
64
 Investment in such measures will—the reasoning goes—be 
easier to justify and more likely to yield manifestly net-positive outcomes regardless of whether 
their adaptation benefits ever materialize.  
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 Boston Water and Sewer Commission, Capital Improvement Program 2017-2019, at 7 (Nov. 2016), 
https://perma.cc/2JV3-5S3P (“Critical elements of this Plan include: . . . Assessment of the Commission’s Service 
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 See Charlie Jewell et al., BWSC Climate Change Risk Assessment, Findings and Mitigation/Adaptation Strategies 
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 William H. Butler et al., Low-Regrets Incrementalism: Land Use Planning Adaptation to Accelerating Sea Level 
Rise in Florida’s Coastal Communities, 36 Journal of Planning Education and Research 319-332 (May 2016), 
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change: a review of current literature, April 2013, Volume 58, Issue 2, pp 305–311. 
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Evaluation is no mere procedural formality: because the future is uncertain, planners 
cannot safely assume that parameters relevant to their decisions—from the rate of sea level rise 
to the range and seasonality of infectious disease vectors—will be consistent with multi-decadal 
projections. Thus, because effective adaptation efforts are necessarily “dynamic iterative learning 
processes,”
65
 they should assume that more information about climate-driven hazards and 
vulnerabilities will be revealed over time, and that preliminary decisions should be evaluated as 
new information corrects earlier assumptions—whether about the environment or the measure’s 
design.
66
 Notably, however, while this “adaptive management” approach is widely considered a 
best practice,
67
 “[t]here is little literature evaluating the effectiveness of adaptation actions,” and 
most efforts at evaluation “to date, have focused on the creation of process-based rather than 
outcome-based indicators.”
68
 Evaluations of hazard mitigation efforts not expressly oriented to 
climate change are more numerous and can serve as models for evaluating adaptation efforts, 




Hundreds of cities and smaller localities have engaged in some version of the process 
described above,
70
 in some instances on their own initiative and in others steered or supported by 
state and/or federal law or policy.
71
 Many of the resulting adaptation measures have been 
demonstrated to reduce vulnerability to climate change-driven impacts.
72
 Some do so by 
reducing exposure to hazards, for instance by retreating from a coastline or elevating coastal 
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 For examples of state laws that have prompted and guided local adaptation planning, see, e.g., CRRA (NY); Peril 
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http://perma.cc/7VU6-ZGF4 (noting that most ordinances’ language is not self-executing and that this “may result in 
situations in which comprehensive plan language appears more proactive than the tangible actions of a local 
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CLIMATE CHANGE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW (forthcoming) 




structures above the level of floodwaters expected during the structures’ life. Others do so by 
reducing the hazards themselves, for instance by installing large amounts of urban green 
infrastructure to mitigate the urban heat island effect. And still others do so by increasing 
resilience, for instance by enlarging the capacity of stormwater management systems in 
anticipation of downpours that would otherwise leave streets temporarily flooded.  
To explore these points with respect to the built environment, this subpart returns to the 
hazards described in part I.A. above and considers examples of adaptation measures—ranging 
from the immediate to the long-term, the local to the regional, and the incremental to the 
transformational—that are responsive to them. 
 
1. Heat, especially in cities 
Adaptive responses to heat range widely and are not reducible to as unified and 
straightforward a framework as adaptations to coastal flooding. As described below, they cover 
the full ranges of geographic scope, timeframe, degree of change, and other dimensions of 
adaptation measures listed in part I.A of this chapter.  
Measures taken to cope directly with individuals’ vulnerability over short time frames 
include: providing warnings on hot days, establishing and publicizing the presence of temporary 
cooling centers where vulnerable populations live or work, and creating community support 
networks like the “Be A Buddy” component of New York City’s Cool Neighborhoods initiative, 
which links community organizations with vulnerable individuals and facilitates phone or in-
person check-ins on hot days.
73
 These measures generally do not alter the built environment, but 
instead identify and correct for instances where permanent features of the built environment fail 
to reduce a sensitive population’s exposure to the hazard of heat—or exacerbate that exposure.
74
 
Other measures reduce individuals’ vulnerability indirectly by making changes to design 
specifications and maintenance protocols for electricity infrastructure and transit networks.
75
 
These changes generally modify the composition and operation of elements of the built 
environment—a bit like a house that remains adjacent to the shore but is raised on stilts in 
anticipation of flooding. They can also, however, be more transformative, for instance by 
relocating system components or reformulating the system’s physical and operational features to 
support different capabilities, like the “islanding” of segments of an electricity distribution grid 
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when transmission lines are inoperable. The geographic scope of these changes generally reflects 
the jurisdiction of the regulatory authority requiring and/or authorizing them.
76
  
Finally, some measures seek to reduce the hazard itself by changing the materials and 
morphology of a cityscape. These include increasing the albedo of roofs, pavements, and walls;
77
 
replacing impervious surfaces with green infrastructure to increase both albedo and (under some 
circumstances) cooling action through evapotranspiration;
78
 and preserving or creating wind 
corridors.
79
  “Cool roof” programs are quick, low-cost examples of such measures that alter 
almost nothing about the built environment but achieve measurable temperature reductions on 
surfaces and within buildings covered by those surfaces.
80
 Replacing impervious surfaces with 
green infrastructure, such as rain gardens and extensive (shallow) or intensive (deep) green roofs, 
is more involved than cool roofing and has a more complicated relationship to adaptation to the 
heat hazard. To begin, while some tree canopies clearly reduce air temperatures in their vicinity 
by raising albedo and performing evapotranspiration, small patches of greenery are less certain to 
do so,
81
 which means that a city seeking to abate its urban heat island cannot expect success to 
follow from merely accumulating fragmented and disparate patches of low-cost green 
infrastructure. Furthermore, while green infrastructure has several justifications linked to public 
health, because its primary justification is often stormwater management, its design and 
placement tends to be oriented to detaining stormwater rather than cooling the ambient air. As 
for the preservation or creation of urban wind corridors, this is an especially clear example of 
transforming a cityscape on a permanent basis for the sake of adaptation to heat hazards.  
2. Coastal flooding 
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Adaptive responses to encroaching seas and more intense coastal storms take one (or a 
combination) of three forms: protection, accommodation, or retreat.
82
 Protection means 
interposing barriers—whether “hard armoring,” such as sea walls, or “soft armoring,” such as 
living shorelines
83
—between rising seas and landward assets and people with the goal of 
preserving existing patterns of development and activity. Accommodation means staying in the 
same place—“living with water”
84
—but changing local land uses and building and infrastructure 
design in ways that reduce vulnerability and improve resiliency to flooding. Concretely, this 
could include compelling real estate sellers to disclose vulnerability to flooding, elevating 
mechanical or electrical components within buildings, elevating whole structures, or up-rating 
machinery to endure inundation by saltwater.
85
 Partial or full retreat, which involves abandoning 
land and assets made vulnerable by rising seas, is only simple conceptually; its planning and 
implementation are legally and politically complex.
86
 Consider Miami Beach, where seawalls 
cannot prevent saltwater from flooding city streets by infiltrating via the porous bedrock.
87
 
Though retreat—managed or otherwise—appears inevitable, the City Engineer recently 
remarked: “When somebody says, ‘How much are you willing to fall back?’ I say, ‘Not one 
inch.’ We are defending this city at the shoreline. Miami Beach is only one mile wide. If we drop 
back a mile, we don’t have a city.”
88
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Each of these approaches can take smaller-scale “incremental” forms that aim to cope with 
hazards, or larger “transformational” forms that aim to greatly reduce or even eliminate 
vulnerabilities. Protection: in contrast to a modest seawall or living shoreline seaward of one 
parcel of property, the State of Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan envisions wetland and 
barrier island restorations on a scale large enough to stem—and ideally offset—the rapid 
subsidence and erosion of the state’s entire coastline.
89
 Accommodation: like the elevation of a 
beach house, only on the scale of citywide infrastructure, Miami Beach has raised many of its 
streets and sidewalks by several feet, such that floodwaters inundate them less severely and less 
often.
90
 Retreat: this approach is inherently transformational, but it can be undertaken in a 
disorganized fashion, as happened in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
91
 or in coordinated 
fashion, as has happened with state support and guidance on Staten Island and with federal 
support in Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana and Taholah Village, Washington.
92
 
Among the policy tools used to effectuate these categories of coastal adaptation are: 
Land use rules and restrictions 
• Conditional development; 
• Conservation easements; 
• Floodplain regulations; 
• Hard- and soft-armoring permits; 
• Land Trusts; 
• Real estate disclosures; 
• Rebuilding restrictions; 
• Setbacks and buffers; 
• Transferable development rights; 
• Zoning and overlay zones. 
Design prescriptions 
• Building codes; 
• Infrastructure design parameters. 
 
Fees and financing 
• Coastal land acquisition programs;  
• Flood insurance requirements; 
• Impact fees; 
• Level of service downgrades; 
• Special assessments; 
• Stormwater utility. 
 
Each of these is described in greater depth elsewhere.
93
 For this chapter’s purposes, the key point 
to take from the list is that the tools for adapting to coastal flooding are the same as conventional 
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planning in coastal communities. Importantly, public health seldom factors directly into the use 
of these tools, which draw instead on inputs relating to land values, engineering specifications, 
and aesthetic preferences. 
II. Legal Issues 
The preceding section discusses policies and measures responsive to particular climate-
driven impacts, but leaves discussion of legal requirements and constraints that those responses 
are sure to encounter for this section. This section’s discussion is not comprehensive with respect 
to legal issues arising from efforts to adapt—it does not, for instance, discuss disputes among 
private actors, nor conflicts and entanglements arising from government-led adaptation efforts’ 
intersecting with legal obligations imposed by federal laws, such as the Clean Water Act’s 
requirements for stormwater management. Instead, it focuses on situations in which state or local 
governments run the risk of litigation brought by private actors. One such situation arises when 
governments’ efforts to reduce adverse public health impacts by adapting land uses and the built 
environment to climate change cause some individuals to arguably be harmed economically by 
decreased property values or limitations on the use of their property. In such cases, people may 
attempt to sue the regulating entity to compensate them for their loss, or else to try to stop the 
project altogether. Another situation arises when a lack of action by governments to adapt to 
climate change impacts arguably causes injuries or property damage that could have been 
prevented by improved infrastructure or other measures. Thus governments can expose 
themselves to legal risk whether they take a passive or active role in adapting the built 
environment to climate change.  
This section explores two types of claims litigants may bring against governments either for 
adapting to climate change or for failing to do so. First, it considers a “takings” claim, also 
known as an inverse condemnation claim, which may be brought by a property owner against a 
government where the government’s actions diminish the property’s value. Such claims can be 
expected when governments make decisions related to coastal infrastructure or land use in 
particular.
94
 Next, it considers a negligence claim, which alleges that an entity or individual’s 
actions fell below a reasonable standard of care, and therefore harmed the individual bringing the 
lawsuit. These are not the only legal theories that could be brought by parties seeking to 
challenge action or inaction related to climate change or its impacts, but they are among the most 
readily available to parties vying with government defendants. They thus provide a useful 
illustration of the legal risks governments face and the limits to redress available to plaintiffs in 
the context of a changing climate. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
para. 1, https://perma.cc/3RLM-DY7K (accessed Jan. 6, 2017) (“any road categorized as ‘environmentally 
compromised’ under this ordinance shall be the subject of a requested design/maintenance exception.”). 
94
 See, e.g., Jordan v. St. Johns County, 63 So. 3d 835 (2011). 
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A. Takings Claims 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides 
that “private property [may not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
95
 The 
Fourteenth Amendment extends this prohibition to states and municipalities.
96
 Many state 
constitutions also contain a takings clause closely mirroring the federal clause
97
 or providing 




In the most clear-cut cases, a private property owner may sue the government for 
physically occupying his property or for completely depriving him of the economically 
beneficial use of his property.
99
 Such cases are known as per se takings and, if proven, require 
the government to pay the owner “just compensation” for the deprivation.  
In contrast, governments often institute regulations that decrease the range of uses 
available to a property owner, and possibly decrease property values, but do not completely 
deprive the owner of the use of his property. For example, in response to encroaching sea levels, 
a local government might impose a setback requirement, such that property owners cannot build 
on the portions of their plot closest to the shore. If an owner sued the local government for 
imposing the setback requirement,
100
 his “regulatory takings” challenge would be governed by 
the multi-factor test announced in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.
101
 The 
Penn Central test requires courts to inquire as to 1) the economic impact of the regulation on the 
property owner, 2) the character of the governmental action, and 3) the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with the economic expectations of the property owner.
102
 In other 
words, courts determining the merit of a regulatory takings claim must balance the interests of 
the parties, with a focus on the magnitude and character of the burden a particular regulation 
imposes upon private property rights. 
1. Claims against governments in response to adaptation plans and policies 
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WL 10285888 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2015) 
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 438 U.S. 104 (1978) 
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 Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 212 (1986) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). 
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Several cases demonstrate the challenges that property owners face when bringing 
takings claims in response to climate change adaptation policies adopted by the federal or local 
government. In one such case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected a takings claim 
brought by a property owner who had been prohibited from developing since its land was located 
within a floodplain.
103
 This prohibition is an example of an adaptation measure designed to 
reduce exposure to hazards by decreasing the amount of development within an area likely to 
experience flooding. The developer, Columbia Venture, LLC, purchased more than 4,000 acres 
of land along a riverbank. At the time of purchase, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) was in the process of designating most of the area a regulatory floodway. The South 
Carolina county in which Columbia Venture’s property was located adopted the FEMA maps, 
and, through an existing local ordinance, restricted construction in the floodway. The County’s 
land-use standards were more restrictive than those required by the federal government in 





A Special Referee was appointed to consider Columbia Venture’s regulatory taking 
claim. Applying the Penn Central factors, the Special Referee concluded that FEMA’s 
designation of Columbia Venture’s property as a regulatory floodway caused a significant 
decrease in the property’s value.
105
 This factor was outweighed, however, by the fact that 
Columbia Venture’s expectation of being able to develop the property was unreasonable in light 
of the foreseeable potential regulatory bar on floodplain development. Moreover, the county’s 
floodplain regulations served an important purpose — flood protection. 
 
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Special Referee’s decision that the 
county’s floodway development restrictions did not constitute a taking. With respect to 
Columbia Venture’s investment-backed expectations, the court held that the developer faced an 
“uncertain path forward” in light of the pending FEMA flood maps and associated county 
regulations. The county was a long-time participant in federal flood planning programs, and the 
developer was a sophisticated party with notice of the county’s floodplain development 
restrictions, as well as the pendency of FEMA’s revised floodway designation. The planned 
development was, therefore “purely speculative in nature,” and the developer’s expectation of 
being able to successfully pursue the development was unreasonable. The Supreme Court also 
acknowledged “the important public purposes of mitigating the social and economic costs of 
flooding [] served by the County’s ordinances.”
106
 Thus, the County was not responsible for 
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 Columbia Venture, LLC v. Richland Cty., 413 S.C. 423, 431, 776 S.E.2d 900, 904 (2015), reh’g denied (Oct. 9, 
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1458 (2016). 
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paying the developer “just compensation,” despite the impact of its floodplain regulations on the 




As the court recognized in Columbia Venture, there is no “magic formula” for applying 
the Penn Central factors in determining whether a government regulation causing interference 
with property is a taking.
108
 In light of the “nearly infinite variety of ways in which government 
actions or regulations can affect property interests,” climate change adaptation policies’ 
vulnerability to a takings claim will depend on the circumstances of the particular landowner’s 
case. One conclusion that can be gleaned from Columbia Venture, however, is that governments 
choosing to pursue climate change adaptation policies should do so as soon as possible. As a 
report prepared by the University of Maine’s Marine Law Institute observed in the context of a 
coastal retreat policy proposal, “[t]he earlier that the public is on notice of the…policy choice…, 
the more likely the regulations are to withstand legal challenge. Property that is purchased after 
the regulations are adopted will be bought subject to the expectations that the development 




2. Claims against governments for failure to adapt the built environment 
Property owners may also initiate litigation against the government for taking private 
property where the government fails to prevent the impacts of climate change, thereby indirectly 
causing damage to the owner’s property.
110
 
For example: Starting in the 1950s, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the 
Corps) built the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), a 76-mile channel between New 
Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico intended to provide a shorter shipping route.
111
 Although 
MRGO was designed to be 500 feet wide, decades of use eroded the channel to more than triple 
its design width.
112
 MRGO’s increased width allowed the channel to carry a much greater 
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volume of water, exposed a greater surface area to wind causing more severe waves, and carried 
saltwater inland, destroying buffer wetlands. When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in 2005, 
several levees and storm walls surrounding MRGO were destroyed, and the city was devastated 
by the resultant flooding.
113
  
In the aftermath of the hurricane, hundreds of plaintiffs sued the United States 
government to recover damages for flooded property. Although a series of cases brought under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) were unsuccessful because the government was found to be 
immune from suit,
114
 a more recent decision in a case brought under the Takings Clause found in 
favor of the property owners. 
In Saint Bernard Parish Government v. United States,
115
 Judge Susan Braden of the 
United States Court of Federal Claims found that the Corps’ negligent design and failure to 
maintain MRGO exacerbated flood damage in parts of New Orleans. The increased flooding, 
although temporary, wrongfully deprived landowners of the use of their property requiring 
compensation. Judge Braden’s decision relied heavily on a 2012 Supreme Court case, Arkansas 
Game and Fish Commission v. United States, which held that temporary flooding caused by 
government action is not categorically exempt from Takings Clause liability.
116
 The plaintiffs in 
Saint Bernard Parish avoided the sovereign immunity issues that prevented the FTCA litigants 
from recovering damages, because the United States has waived sovereign immunity for claims 
brought under the Takings Clause through the Tucker Act.
117
  
That the government was held liable for inadequately preparing federally-constructed and 
maintained infrastructure for severe weather events in Saint Bernard Parish is significant in light 
of the increasing risk of such events due to climate change. Notably, Saint Bernard Parish, if it 
survives appeal, expands government liability from situations in which the government 
deliberately causes flooding, for example by releasing water from a dam, to include situations in 
which inaction by the government exacerbates flooding from severe weather through its failure 




 In those cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals at first affirmed the trial court’s finding of liability, but then 
issued a subsequent ruling finding that the government was immune from the plaintiffs’ claims, because its actions 
in connection with the design and maintenance of MR-GO were largely discretionary. In re Katrina Canal Breaches 
Litigation, 673 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding the federal government liable for Hurricane Katrina flood damage 
caused by the Corps’ failure to armor the banks of MRGO); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436 
(5
th
 Cir. 2012) (reversing the Circuit Court’s prior decision and finding the federal government immune from suit 
under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA). 
115
 St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015). The case has been appealed to the Federal 
Circuit Court for Federal Claims. Notice of Docketing, St. Bernard Parish v. US, Case 16-2301 (Fed. Cir. July 6, 
2016). As of August 2017, that proceeding is ongoing.  
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to properly design or maintain federally owned infrastructure.
118
 Professor Christopher Serkin 
has argued that the Takings Clause can serve as a basis for affirmative governmental obligations 
to protect private property more generally and cites sea level rise as “an ideal illustration” of an 
environmental shift that could require governments to act.
119
 While governments obviously do 
not have an obligation to protect all property from all intrusions, a duty arises where the state 
exercises regulatory control over the injury-causing condition or where the state is complicit in 
creating the conditions responsible for harm to the property.
120
 This developing area of law will 
have broad implications for state governments seeking to prepare for – or deliberately deciding 
not to prepare for – climate change impacts. 
Some legal scholars have expressed concern that Saint Bernard Parish and Arkansas 
Game and Fish Commission allow the takings doctrine to improperly invade the traditional 
domain of tort law.
121
 The apparent expansion of takings liability ushered in by these cases, 
however, will likely be tempered by the fact specific analysis required in cases asserting claims 
for temporary takings due to flooding or other natural disasters. As Judge Braden explained, a 
plaintiff asserting a claim for a temporary taking must establish: (1) a protectable property 
interest under state law; (2) the character of the property and the owners’ “reasonable-investment 
backed expectations”; (3) foreseeability; (4) causation; and (5) substantiality.  
The first prong merely requires the plaintiff to show that he has an ownership interest in 
the property allegedly taken through government inaction.
122
 With respect to the owners’ 
reasonable investment backed expectations, as discussed in the previous section, courts inquire 
whether the plaintiff was aware of the risks facing his property. In Saint Bernard Parish, the 
court concluded that “although Plaintiffs’ properties were in a floodplain and ‘had experienced 
flooding in the past,’ that flooding was not ‘comparable’ to the flooding during Hurricane 
Katrina and subsequent hurricanes and severe storms giving rise to the temporary takings claim 
                                                          
118
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 Professor Serkin has posited that “an ‘ecological change’ can interfere with owners’ 
expectations just as much as an explicit legal transition.”
124
 As climate change causes 
increasingly severe natural disasters, more courts could find that a property owner’s past 
experience with severe weather does not adequately put him on notice of future risk.  
The foreseeability prong of a temporary takings claim invites an inquiry into “the degree 
to which the [government’s] invasion is … the foreseeable result of government action.”
125
 In 
Saint Bernard Parish, the court found that it was foreseeable that MRGO would intensify 
flooding in New Orleans based on a variety of environmental factors, including increased erosion 
on MRGO’s banks and increased storm surge.
126
 The plaintiffs were also able to establish a 
causal connection between the Corps’ failure to maintain MRGO and flooding during Hurricane 
Katrina, since the Corps’ inaction was the cause of the erosion, increased storm surge, and other 
exacerbating factors.
127
 As discussed in the previous section, developing adaptation measures 
requires that governments assess vulnerabilities. As governments compile data and develop 
models projecting future vulnerabilities, potential impacts due to government action or inaction 
may become increasingly foreseeable.  
Finally, a plaintiff alleging a temporary taking must show a sufficiently severe economic 
impact on his property to constitute a legally cognizable interference.
128
 Moreover, the plaintiff 
must establish that the government’s inaction caused the diminished property value; in other 
words, the government must have had the ability to protect the property at issue.
129
 In Saint 
Bernard Parish, the Plaintiffs established this element by showing that their properties were 
flooded because of the Corps’ negligent maintenance of MRGO and that they lost their ability to 
access or use their properties for a “significant” time period – ranging from a few weeks to a few 
months – following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
130
  
In December 2016, the Corps appealed Judge Braden’s ruling, arguing that the plaintiffs’ 
case “would at most establish a potential tort claim, not a Fifth Amendment taking.”
131
 The 
Corps contends that flooding from Hurricane Katrina did not constitute a taking, because the 
government did not intend to flood plaintiffs’ properties. Instead, according to the Corps, the 
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Until the Corps’ appeal is finally decided – and there is a good likelihood the case will go 
to the Supreme Court – there is reason to believe that the argument for using the Takings Clause 
to impose an affirmative duty to protect private property, at least in cases where the 
government’s past actions create vulnerabilities to natural disaster risk, is emerging. Such cases 
could promote climate change adaptation by encouraging governments to weigh the costs and 
benefits of both action and inaction in the face of the increasing risk of natural disasters. 
B. Negligence claims 
On April 18, 2013, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn declared a state of emergency after heavy 
rain caused extensive flooding in Chicago and the surrounding area.
133
 Residents of some 
Chicago suburbs were evacuated, and people were urged to reduce household water use to 
prevent further flooding at the Chicago River.
134
 Tens of thousands of people lost power, a 
sinkhole swallowed cars, and hundreds of flights were canceled at O’Hare airport.
135
  
Several months later, a group of insurance companies sued Chicago and over 100 nearby 
local governments in a series of class action lawsuits, claiming that the municipalities did not do 
enough to prevent the flooding.
136
 The insurance companies argued that the local governments 
were negligent in failing to prepare for the impacts of climate change and sought to be 
reimbursed for claims paid to property owners.
137
 The cases were quickly withdrawn,
138
 but 




 Chicago Flooding: Heavy Rain Storm Prompts Emergency, Road Closures in Cook County, HUFFINGTON POST 




 Id.; Staff Report, Storms Cause Damage, Power Outages, NBC Chicago (June 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.nbcchicago.com/weather/stories/Storms-Chicago-Severe-Weather-211009451.html. 
136
 Illinois Farmers Insurance Company v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, No. 14-
CH-06608 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Co.); Robert McCoppin, Insurance company drops suits over Chicago-area flooding, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 3, 2014) http://trib.in/2sPL9LY. 
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 If litigated, such cases would likely 
require inquiry into governments’ efforts to implement various adaptation measures, such as 
requiring elevation of structures to reduce flooding or investing in green infrastructure to 
decrease by-pass events by draining severe rainfall.   
1. Government Immunity 
State governments are generally protected from litigation by the doctrine of “sovereign 
immunity.”
141
 Overcoming sovereign immunity presents a significant hurdle in negligence cases 
in both federal and state courts by virtue of their sovereignty.
142
 Sovereign immunity extends 
both to the government entity itself and to government officials sued in their official 
capacities.
143
 States may consent to be sued, and many have waived sovereign immunity under 
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 E.g. Tzakis v. Berger Excavating Contractors, Inc., No. 09 CH 06159 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Co.) (class action 
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429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)); Crouch v. City of Kansas City, 444 S.W.3d 517, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (municipalities 
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immunity protects municipalities from tort liability arising from the exercise of governmental functions). 
142
 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (doctrine is derived from the laws and practices of English ancestors); 
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (part of the very nature of sovereignty to be immune from unconsented suits). 
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 HCMF Corp. v. Gilmore, 26 F. Supp. 2d 873, 878 (W.D. Va. 1998) (Virginia's Eleventh Amendment immunity 
“extends to state officials when they are merely the nominal defendants and ‘the state is the real, substantial party in 
interest.’”); Illinois Health Care Ass’n v. Walters, 303 Ill. App. 3d 435, 438, 710 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 
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S.E.2d 18 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, review denied, 763 S.E.2d 394 (N.C. 2014) (“governmental immunity 
shields municipalities and the officers or employees thereof sued in their official capacities from suits based on torts 
committed while performing a governmental function.”). 
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Nonetheless, it is sometimes possible to formulate a claim such that it falls outside the 
scope of state and local governments’ immunity.
145
 While the nuances of sovereign immunity 
vary from state to state, certain exceptions are common. First, while sovereign immunity 
generally bars suits seeking monetary damages against government agencies, actions for 
declaratory judgment or injunctive relief are permissible in some states.
146
 Second, within certain 
jurisdictions, governmental immunity for tort claims is waived when the government purchases 
liability insurance covering such claims.
147
  
Many states immunize discretionary functions, but allow suit against governments and 
government officials for “ministerial” actions.
148
 In distinguishing between discretionary acts 
and ministerial functions, “the key factor is the presence of basic policy formulation, planning, or 
                                                          
144
 New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 728 A.2d 673, 675 (Me. 1999) (we start from the premise that 
immunity is the rule and exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed); Lockwood v. City of Pittsburgh, 751 
A.2d 1136, 1139 (Pa. 2000) (exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed); Guillen v. City of San Antonio, 13 
S.W.3d 428, 433 (Tex. App. 2000) (the Texas Tort Claims Act is a limited waiver of absolute common law 
immunity…construed strictly on the side of preserving immunity). 
145
 6 Litigating Tort Cases § 66:2 (“whether immunity applies is often a matter of how the claim is characterized 
rather than the reality of the claim itself”). 
146
 Atl. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Webster Cnty., Miss., No. 140-CV-23, 2014 WL 3437019, at *6 (N.D. Miss. July 11, 
2014) (while municipalities are immune from certain claims for monetary damages, governmental immunity does 
not prevent plaintiffs from seeking declaratory relief); Roland v. Epps, 10 So. 3d 972, 974 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (“a 
state official may be sued for injunctive relief in his or her official capacity”); Legal Capital, LLC. v. Med. Prof’l 
Liab. Catastrophe Loss Fund, 750 A.2d 299, 302 (Pa. 2000) (sovereign immunity does not apply because it is not 
applicable to declaratory judgment actions); Texas Dep't of Banking v. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n, 27 S.W.3d 
276, 281 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding that sovereign immunity did not bar suit for declaratory relief); Penland v. 
Redwood Sanitary Sewer Serv. Dist., 956 P.2d 964, 965 (Or. 1998) (discretionary immunity does not bar a suit for 
injunctive relief). 
147
 Napier v. Town of Windham, 187 F.3d 177, 190 (1st Cir. 1999) (Under Maine law, if a governmental entity 
procures insurance that provides coverage in areas where the governmental entity is immune under the state’s Tort 
Claims Act, the entity waives its immunity, but only to the limits of the insurance coverage); City of Caddo Valley v. 
George, 9 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Ariz. 2000) (“a municipal corporation's immunity for negligent acts only begins where 
its insurance coverage leaves off”); Gilbert v. Richardson, 452 S.E.2d 476, 481 (Ga. 1994) (Georgia Tort Claims 
Act waives only sovereign or governmental immunity of local governmental agency to extent of liability insurance 
coverage).  
148
 Trotter v. Sch. Dist. 218, 733 N.E.2d 363, 375 (Ill. 2000); Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 611 
N.W.2d 693, 700 (Wis. 2000) (Under the Wisconsin Tort Claims Act, a municipality is immune from any suit for 
liability arising from discretionary acts); Rivera v. City of Worcester, No. 12-CV-40066, 2015 WL 685800, at *6 (D. 
Mass. Feb. 18, 2015) (in Massachusetts, the discretionary function exception bars government liability for claims 
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty); 
Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 753 A.2d 41, 60-61 (Md. 2000) (in Maryland, government actors 
generally immune from liability where tortious conduct occurred while performing discretionary as opposed to 
ministerial acts”); Chirieleison v. Lucas, 72 A.3d 1218, 1224 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (“a municipal employee is 
liable for the misperformance of ministerial acts, but has a qualified immunity in the performance of governmental 
acts”). 
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policy decisions which are characterized by an exercise of a high degree of official judgment or 
discretion.”
149
 For example, a city exercises discretion when it selects and adopts a public 
improvement plan, but carrying out the plan involves ministerial actions that must be carried out 
in a reasonably safe manner.
150
 
Notably, many states include a “dangerous conditions exception” to sovereign immunity 
in their tort claims acts, allowing law suits arising from a government entity’s maintenance of 
property it owns.
151
 For example, Pennsylvania waives immunity for tort claims arising out of its 
control of, among other things, “utility service facilities,” which include storm water 
management systems.
152
 Statutes carving out such an exception generally impose “a broad duty 
… to maintain safe public places.”
153
 Under this exception, however, the plaintiff must show that 
the government either created the dangerous condition causing the plaintiff’s injury or should 
have known of the condition.
154
  
2. Negligence elements 
Once a plaintiff overcomes a sovereign immunity defense, a governmental entity is 
generally subject to the same rules of liability that apply to nongovernmental entities.
155
 Litigants 
                                                          
149
 6 Litigating Tort Cases § 66:47. 
150
 Trotter, supra note 23. 
151
 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden and Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 336 (2d ed.) (“States also tend to 
eliminate immunity for injuries resulting from badly maintained government property.”). Statutory exceptions to 
sovereign immunity for public property include: 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8542 (a local entity may be liable for “the 
care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the local agency”); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-106 
(sovereign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition of 
any public property, including buildings, highways, and power facilities); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.600 (immunity of 
the public entity is expressly waived for injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property); and Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1406 (governmental agencies liable for injury resulting from dangerous condition of a 
public building if agency had knowledge of the defect and failed to remedy the condition or take action reasonably 
necessary to protect the public against the condition.). 
152
 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8542(5); Rooney v. City of Philadelphia, 623 F. Supp. 2d 644, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
153
 6 Litigating Tort Cases § 66:66. 
154
 Bonilla v. Starrett City at Spring Creek, 704 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (N.Y. 2000) (“To impose liability upon the 
defendants, there must be evidence tending to show the existence of a dangerous or defective condition and that the 
defendants either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it and failed to remedy it within a 
reasonable time); Willis v. City of New Bern, 529 S.E.2d 691, 693 (N.C. 2000) (granting summary judgment for the 
defendant city where the plaintiff did not offer proof that the city had notice of the defect causing her injury); Isbell 
v. Maricopa Cnty., 9 P.3d 311, 314 (Ariz. 2000) (a plaintiff need not establish “notice” if a government agency itself 
creates or causes the dangerous condition.); Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 15 (Tenn. 1997) (The 
government has “constructive notice” of a dangerous condition where it could have been discovered by proper 
diligence and it had a duty to inquiring into it.’”). 
155
 Indeed, courts have imposed liability on the basis of private property owners’ failure to act to prevent damage 
from natural disasters. For example, in California, the owners of an unreinforced building were found to be 
negligent when they failed to retrofit the building, and two people inside were killed during an earthquake. Myrick v. 
Mastagni, 185 Cal. App. 4th 1082, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
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seeking to establish a negligence claim against governments that refuse to prepare for climate 
change would need to show that 1) the official had a duty to prepare for extreme weather events; 
2) the official breached that duty by failing to prepare or causing others to fail to prepare; 3) the 
litigant suffered harm; and 4) this harm was caused or worsened by the government official’s 
breach of duty. While climate change adaptation litigation is a new phenomenon,
156
 analyzing 
the elements of a negligence claim in this context does not require novel legal theories.
157
  
First, the extent of a government’s obligation to protect people and ecosystems from the 
impacts of climate change may be determined by state statute. For example, in Illinois and many 
other states, local governments have an explicit duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain public 
property in a reasonably safe condition.
158
 Plaintiffs should consider basing allegations of 
government negligence for failing to prepare for climate change on this prevalent statutorily 
prescribed government obligation. Many states have enacted statutes enumerating the specific 
obligations of local and state governments.
159
 
Courts may also consider “compelling policy concerns”
160
 to expand the scope of the 
government’s duty beyond those expressed in a state statute.
161
 Such policy concerns include the 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the capacity of the parties to bear the loss, and the 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care.
162
 As scientists work to 
refine predictions of the risk of extreme weather and associated damage to life and property, as 
                                                          
156
 Maxine Burkett, Litigating Climate Change Adaptation: Theory, Practice, and Corrective (Climate) Justice, 42 
Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 11144, 11156 (2012) (observing that no climate change adaptation cases had been 
filed through the end of 2012). 
157
 Id., at 11146 (“[T]ort law is well-equipped in both purpose and function to address the challenges of adapting.”). 
158
 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/3-102. For additional examples of statutes defining a state’s duty to maintain public 
property, see note 26. 
159
 See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-sovereign-immunity-and-tort-liability.aspx (listing state tort claims 
acts); see, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 745, §§ 5/1 et seq.; Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, §§ 8521 et seq.; Cal. Gov. Code §§ 
815, et seq. 
160
 Maxine Burkett, Duty and Breach in an Era of Uncertainty: Local Government Liability for Failure to Adapt to 
Climate Change, 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 775, 786 (2013). 
161
 See Norris v. Borough of Leonia, 734 A.2d 762, 768 (N.J. 1999) (Even in cases where a common law immunity 
has been incorporated into or codified by statute, it remains subject to judicial modification); Donaca v. Curry Cnty., 
734 P.2d 1339 (Or. 1987) (finding that a county’s liability for failure to maintain the grass at an intersection where 
an automobile accident occurred depended on “the existence and magnitude of the risk at the intersection…[and the] 
feasibility and cost of avoiding the risk….”); Fazzolari By & Through Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 717 
P.2d 1210 (Or. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987) (finding that a jury could reasonably conclude that a 
public school had a duty to protect a student who was attacked on school grounds, after another person had been 
raped on campus two weeks earlier); Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, supra note 23 (in case against 
city, listing variables to be considered in determining if a duty exists, including the foreseeability of the harm and 
the burden on the city of imposing a duty to exercise care). 
162
 See, e.g., Ameriwood Indus. Int’l Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 961 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (W.D. Mich. 1997); 
Torres v. Graves, No. 92-CV-4449, 1993 WL 19753, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1993); Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F. 
Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
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manifested in vulnerability assessments, these impacts are increasingly foreseeable. Moreover, 
governments will almost always have a greater capacity to bear losses than individuals. And 
imposing a duty on governments to prepare for climate change will generally yield positive 
outcomes for communities that will otherwise be vulnerable to devastation from natural disasters 
and other climate risks. In short, policy concerns may support the imposition of a governmental 




Some jurisdictions adhere to the “public duty doctrine,” which provides that 
governmental entities and their agents owe duties only to the general public, not to individuals, 
absent a “special relationship” or “special duty” between the entity and the injured party.
164
 The 
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois did so in a case brought against several municipalities by 
plaintiffs alleging a failure to prepare for climate change: the court held that the city defendants 
did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs in connection with their performance of public 
duties.
165
 A litigant may overcome this public duty defense by showing that the government 
voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiff in particular.
166
 Doing so creates a special relationship 
between the plaintiff and a governmental agency and with it a duty of care towards the individual 
even for discretionary functions.
167
 A special relationship may arise when the government 
performs an affirmative act, or makes a specific promise or representation that under the 
circumstances creates a justifiable reliance on the part of the person injured.
168
 Notably, many 
states have abandoned the public duty doctrine altogether.
169
 Given its potential application to 
                                                          
163
 Duty and Breach, supra note __, at 786. 
164
 City Of Toccoa v. Pittman, 648 S.E.2d 733, 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Stone v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Labor, 495 
S.E.2d 711, 714 (N.C. 1998). 
165
 Tzakis, supra note __, April 3 Order re PDR Decision as to LPES and other issues, https://perma.cc/LD7X-94QX 
(finding the public entity defendants immune under Illinois’ Public Duty Rule (citing Harinek v. 161 N. Clark 
St./Ltd Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 345-47 (Ill. 1998)). 
166
 6 Litigating Tort Cases § 66:48; see also Souder v. Cannon, 235 S.W.3d 841, 852 (Tex. App. 2007). 
167
 Japan Airlines Co. v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 178 F.3d 103, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (there is no 
governmental immunity where a special relationship exists between the governmental entity and the injured party); 
Hartley v. Floyd, 512 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Once defendant agreed to perform certain tasks, 
“his actions ceased to be discretionary actions and became merely operational level activities which must be 
performed with reasonable care and for which there is no sovereign immunity.”). 
168
 6 Litigating Tort Cases § 66:48; 1515-1519 Lakeview Boulevard Condo. Ass’n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 43 P.3d 
1233, 1240 (Wash. 2002) (plaintiff demonstrated a special relationship with respect to the government’s 
maintenance of a storm drain system by showing direct contact between a government official and herself, express 
assurances given by a public official, and justifiable reliance on those assurances.) 
169
 Jean W. v. Com., 610 N.E.2d 305 (Mass. 1993) (abolishing public duty doctrine in Massachusetts); Adams v. 
State, 555 P.2d 235, 243 (Alaska 1976) (abolishing public duty doctrine and applying traditional negligence analysis 
to government); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982) (same); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (public 
duty doctrine held no longer applicable in Colorado); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 
1010 (Fla. 1979) (holding governmental negligence to be determined by non-public entity standards); Wilson v. 
Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979) (abolishing public duty doctrine); Schear v. Board of County Comm’rs, 687 
P.2d 728 (N.M. 1984) (public duty doctrine abolished by statute); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719 (Or. 
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circumstances in which state or local government actors seek to protect individuals from heat 
waves or floods but fall short, climate change might push the remaining states to do so as well. 
Establishing that a government has an affirmative duty to act is more difficult than 
establishing that the government must exercise due care when it chooses to act. For example, 
showing that the government was negligent for failing to build a levee may present greater 
challenges than showing that the government was negligent in building a levee that was poorly 
designed or inadequately maintained, since the former might be said to require a greater degree 
of discretion. Even where a litigant ostensibly seeks damages for a government’s “failure to act,” 
however, it may be possible to characterize the government’s obligation in other terms.
170
 Since 
state governments make decisions in the context of an existing web of infrastructure, such as 
sewer systems and levees, the distinction between the duty to maintain government-owned 
property and to build new structures can be blurry.
171
  
Importantly, even where a government action is shielded by discretionary immunity, if 
that action ultimately creates a dangerous condition known to the government but not readily 
apparent to people who could be injured by the condition, the governmental entity must take 
steps to avert the danger or properly warn people of the danger.
172
 For example, in City of St. 
Petersburg v. Collom, three individuals drowned when they fell into open storm drainage ditches 
owned by the city.
173
 The court expressed doubt that the city defendant could be held liable for 
defects in its “overall plan for the drainage system,” since such planning constitutes a 
discretionary function.
174
 The St. Petersburg court held, nonetheless, that the plaintiffs had stated 
a cause of action against the city defendant for its failure to either warn people of the open drain 
hazard or to correct the dangerous condition by adding fences or other barriers around the 
ditches.
175
 According to the St. Petersburg court, “a governmental entity may not create a known 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1979) (abolishing public duty doctrine); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1976) (same); DeWald v. 
State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986) (same). 
170
 See Jean W. v. Com., supra note __, at 312 (providing examples of cases that could be characterized either as 
cases of misfeasance or nonfeasance). 
171
 See Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 
345, 348 (2014) (arguing, in the Takings Clause context, that “[p]reexisting regulatory intervention means that the 
government should not be able to wash its hands of responsibility now.”) 
172
 City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 1982); Jezek v. City of Midland, 605 S.W.2d 544, 
548 (Tex.1980); see also Larson v. Township of New Haven, 165 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Minn. 1969); Teall v. City of 
Cudahy, 386 P.2d 493 (Cal. 1963); Lowman v. City of Mesa, 611 P.2d 943 (Ariz. App. 1980). 
173
 City of St. Petersburg, supra note __. 
174
 Id., at 1086 (“defects inherent in the overall plan for an improvement, as approved by a governmental entity, are 
not matters that in and of themselves subject the entity to liability”) (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 
1071 (Fla. 1982)). 
175
 Id., at 1085–87. 
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hazard or trap and then claim immunity from suit for injuries resulting from that hazard on the 
grounds that it arose from a judgmental, planning-level decision.”
176
  
Assuming that a government entity has a duty to take action to protect citizens from the 
impacts of climate change, what would constitute a breach of that duty? The failure to provide 
complete protection from harm clearly does not itself constitute a breach of duty.
177
 Instead, 
establishing a breach of the duty to prepare for the impacts of climate change would likely 
require a showing that the government’s inaction exposed people to unnecessary risks. In this 
context, significant deference to the government in weighing the costs and benefits of its actions 
is certainly appropriate. Deference should not, however, “amount to abdication of oversight in 
the context of either action or inaction.”
178
 
The well-known “Hand formula” is a useful starting point in determining whether a 
defendant has breached his duty of care,
179
 but would likely be difficult for courts to apply amid 
climatic changes. Generally, the formula dictates that a person breaches his duty where the 
likelihood of harm multiplied by the magnitude of harm is greater than the cost of preventing that 
harm.
180
 In the context of a case alleging failure to prepare for climate change, the likelihood of 
harm is the chance of a particular event, such as a heat wave or a 100-year flood,
181
 at the time of 
                                                          
176
 Id., at 1086; see also Rooney, supra note __ (finding that a city may not be held liable for an inadequate storm 
water management system, but it may be liable for damages resulting from negligence in the construction or 
maintenance of the sewer system). 
177
 Instead, courts may find that a government has fulfilled its duty where its actions were justified by the 
information and resources available at the time of the action or omission at issue Cootey v. Sun Inv., Inc., 718 P.2d 
1086, 1090 (Haw. 1986) (“Government is not intended to be an insurer of all the dangers of modern life, despite its 
ever-increasing effort to protect its citizens from peril.”); Jean W. v. Com., supra note 43, at 314-15 (“Police 
departments are no more responsible for every harm that befalls victims of crime than fire departments are 
responsible for every sparking of a fire, and neither should be an insurer of every loss sustained in those contexts.”).  
178
 Serkin, supra note __, at 385. 
179
 Dobbs, supra note 26 § 161 (“If the defendant's cost of preventing the harm is less than the expected value of the 
harm itself, he is definitely negligent and liable under the Hand formula”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 291 
(1965) (“Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm to another, the 
risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as 
the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.”). 
180
 In re City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d 235, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 522 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying 
the Hand Formula to determine whether the City of New York was negligent in connection with an accident on the 
Staten Island Ferry); Bhd. Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 985 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(Under the Hand formula, a defendant is negligent if the burden (cost) of the precautions that he could have taken to 
avoid the accident…is less than the loss that the accident could reasonably be anticipated to cause…, discounted 
(i.e., multiplied) by the probability that the accident would occur unless the precautions were taken.”); Levi v. Sw. 
Louisiana Elec. Membership Co-op. (SLEMCO), 542 So. 2d 1081, 1087 (La. 1989) (“When the product of the 
possibility of [injury] multiplied times the gravity of the harm, if it happens, exceeds the burden of precautions, the 
failure to take those precautions is negligence”); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 
1947) (L. Hand, J.) (“if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether 
B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL”). 
181
 FEMA defines a 100-year flood as a flood with a 1% likelihood of occurring or being exceeded in any given 
year, based on historical data. FEMA, Flood Zones, http://www.fema.gov/flood-zones. Climate change has 
increased the risk of a 100-year flood in many areas such that the actual chance of such a flood is great than 1%.  
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the event. Since climate change is causing global alterations in the frequency, severity, and 
geographic distribution of significant adverse events, historical data will become less predictive 
of future events’ probabilities. Instead, best estimates of the likelihood of harm must also draw 
on expert weather and climate projections.
182
 Moreover, the probability of a natural disaster 
should be based on its cumulative chance over a relevant period of time – perhaps from the time 
the government defendant should have been aware of the relevant climate projections to the date 
of the event – rather than in one particular year;
183
 since resiliency measures are implemented for 
the long term, it is irrelevant to the question of breach whether a natural disaster occurs one year 
versus the next.  
For the purposes of applying the Hand formula, the magnitude of the harm should be 
measured by the predicted loss of property and life likely to result from a particular event. 
Hurricane Sandy caused over $50 billion in damage,
184
 and Hurricane Katrina left in its wake 
over $100 billion in damage.
185
 Even if such events are infrequent, the extent of the devastation 
they cause justifies taking precautionary measures to minimize potential damage.
186
 
Other factors may be relevant to whether a governments’ failure to act was reasonable, 
including the precision and accuracy of available climate projections, access to technical and 
monetary resources, the extent to which the precautions would have reduced or eliminated the 
damage, any negative consequences of the precautionary measures beyond their expense, and 
alternative measures taken by the state or city to adapt to climate change. Ultimately, the plaintiff 
“need[s] to prove the unreasonableness of [the] defendant’s actions in light of the well-
                                                          
182
 Long-term projections of future weather and climate conditions often provide a wide range of possible outcomes. 
See, e.g.,  See, e.g., C. Rosenzweig, W. Solecki, A. DeGaetano, M. O’Grady, S. Hassol, P. Grabhorn, Responding to 
climate change in New York State: the ClimAID integrated assessment for effective climate change adaptation, Ann. 
N. Y. Acad. Sci., 1244 (2011), pp. 2–649, https://perma.cc/KJ6X-3Y8L (predicting sea level rise in New York City 
between 15 and 75 inches by 2100). Some courts may be unpersuaded that governments should be held liable for 
failing to act on uncertain projections. Nonetheless, such projections may play a larger role in courts’ liability 
determinations as scientists continue to refine climate models, increasing both their accuracy and precision.  
183
 The cumulative risk of a particular event increases as the time span increases. For example, while the risk of a 
100-year flood may be approximately 1% within the next year, there is at least a 26% chance of a 100-year flood 
over the next 30 years. United States Geological Survey, 100-Year Flood–It’s All About Chance (April 2010), 
https://perma.cc/9H5N-JFNE. 
184
 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Service 
Assessment Hurricane/Post-Tropical Cyclone Sandy, October 22–29, 2012 (May 2013), https://perma.cc/2F3B-
H38Z. 
185
 NOAA, The Deadliest, Costliest, And Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2010 (and 
other frequently requested hurricane facts) (Aug. 2011), https://perma.cc/QCT6-KL6K. 
186
 In re City of New York, supra note __, at 242 (comparing, without quantifying, “[t]he probability … of a scenario 
where the pilot [of the Staten Island Ferry] would become incapacitated … [with] [t]he gravity of … resulting injury 
to its passengers” against the burden of enforcing a safety measure that would have prevented the accident to finding 
New York City negligent); Duty and Breach, supra note __, at 781-82 (“Sandy also underscores the need for local 
governments to appreciate fully the costs of, to date, low probability yet unprecedented and devastating events.”). 
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established science of climate change.”
187
 While certainly a “formidable task,” increasing 
knowledge of climate change risks should increase the potential for liability.
188
 
Establishing the damage element of a negligence claim in this context would not differ 
materially from a typical negligence case. A litigant would have to show that he suffered an 
injury to his person or property. These types of injuries are “especially present in the climate 
adaptation context.”
189
 For example, where flooding causes widespread property damage or a 
heat wave increases mortality rates, many people will have suffered a clear and legally 
cognizable injury. Nonetheless, some states impose statutory dollar limitations to limit the 
amount that can be recovered against a government entity.
190
 
To establish the causation prong of a claim for negligent failure to prepare for climate 
change, the plaintiff would need to show, as in any negligence case, that the defendant’s breach 
of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The question in this context is whether 
the government’s failure to take reasonable measures to protect people from the natural disaster 
at issue caused the damage.  
The plaintiff must identify measures the government could have taken to prevent the 
injury.
191
 Plaintiffs should challenge the city’s failure to upgrade or build or upgrade specific 
infrastructure, rather than the city’s failure to consider climate change impacts in its planning 
documents, since the latter theory would also require the plaintiff to establish that the 
infrastructure would have been upgraded if the planning had been carried out. The litigant would 
not need to show that the natural disaster at issue was caused by climate change.
192
 Instead, the 
                                                          
187
 Litigating Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 156, at 11145. 
188
 Id.; see also Attribution of Extreme Weather Events in the Context of Climate Change, National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2016).  
189
 Id. at 11148. 
190
 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-114; Ga. Code Ann. § 50-21-29; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 466.04. 
191
 See Rooney, supra note 27 (plaintiffs’ claim that city’s negligent maintenance of sewer system caused flood 
damage survived summary judgment motion where plaintiffs presented evidence that clogged sewers caused the 
flooding and city had notice of the condition); Gaylord ex rel. Gaylord v. Morris Twp. Fire Dep’t, 853 A.2d 1112, 
1116 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (Municipal liability arising from real property ownership only available where the 
defect of the land itself causes the injury). 
192
 Issues of causation raise more difficult questions in the context of a climate nuisance suit, since “current 
atmospheric levels of GHGs result from the cumulative emissions of millions or billions of emitters since the onset 
of the industrial revolution[, and] no specific injury can be attributed to any specific polluter.” Michael Gerrard, 
What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, YALE L. J. ONLINE (Sept. 2011); Litigating Climate 
Change Adaptation, supra note 30, at 11145 (observing that “establishing the causal link between a defendant’s 
emissions and the alleged harms” would be the most challenging task for a plaintiff seeking tort remedies from 
greenhouse gas emitters). 
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effect of climate change on the likelihood of the weather event would be a factor in the 
determination of breach and foreseeability, as discussed above.
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As natural disasters become more likely – and, therefore, more foreseeable – due to 
climate change, governments face the risk of being found liable for refusing to take reasonable 
actions to prepare for the impacts of climate change. This type of litigation can serve the duel 
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 Litigating Climate Change Adaptation, supra note __, at 11150 (“Attributing extreme weather events to climate 
change…will occur at the state of establishing defendant’s breach of duty….”). 
